My current research is largely focused on the nature of epistemic norms and how they relate to other norms, such as norms of inquiry and practical norms. I’m currently working on two papers on this theme. The first, coauthored with Carolina Flores, argues that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering, and the second argues for the existence of diachronic norms more broadly. According to the first paper, one is required to gather evidence in cases where doing so is sufficiently easy and would directly result in an `epistemic upgrade’ (e.g. knowledge, understanding, etc). In the second paper, I argue that synchronic requirements underdetermine diachronic requirements using cases where someone seems to impermissibly change their mind without a change in evidence. I defend diachronic norms (including a norm on evidence-gathering) against objections on which they are too demanding or too externalist.
I’m also currently working on a paper with Calum McNamara on why credences can be reasons for action as well as a project on the various ways in which consensual sex can nonetheless be bad in ways that can wrong an agent and be blameworthy.