Discussion Questions 6/16: Nguyen on Echo Chambers & Epistemic Bubbles
Give an example of an echo chamber and of an epistemic bubble. (It can be an example from your own life.)
Note: The examples need not be political, but if they are, I encourage you to think of examples from various parts of the political spectrum.
Assess Nguyen’s solutions for how individuals can escape epistemic bubbles (i.e. letting in new information).
Assess Nguyen’s solution for how individuals can escape echo chambers (i.e. rebooting trust from the ground up)
Think about the cases of Phelps-Roper & Derek Black. Do these agents seem to have followed Nguyen’s method? Why or why not? Is there any part of the story missing from Nguyen’s explanation?
Are epistemic bubbles inherently bad? Or, are they only problematic when they generate false beliefs?
Relatedly: Is there something inherently valuable about diversity of opinion if many of those opinions are false? (Consider our discussion of Mill.)
What lessons should we take away from Nguyen’s article? For instance, are there any lessons regarding how we should engage with and/or think about others who are stuck in echo chambers?
If you finish early, please discuss any other parts of the article or slides that you found interesting and any other lessons gleaned.
Discussion Questions 6/11: Anderson, Democracy & Assessing Scientific Testimony
Anderson illustrates her solution using the example of global warming. Do you think the results would be different or the same if she used a different example?
You can also test this via a quick google search! See what the first few links are, and if they give an indication of the scientific consensus & where dissent is coming from.
Anderson offers 3 explanations for the gap between dispositions & capacities: media, segregation, cultural cognition. Do you think these explanations are correct? Are there other explanations for why people systematically fail to exercise their capacity to judge trustworthiness in a reliable way?
Assess Anderson’s solutions for bridging the gap. Do you think there are other solutions we should consider?
Update her suggestions in light of social media developments.
Even though citizens could, in principle, assess the trustworthiness of experts, Anderson acknowledges that they often don’t. However, echoing Dewey, she thinks that we should fix democracy with more democracy. Do you agree with this? Why or why not? How attractive is the alternative of epistocracy?
Having learned about cultural cognition, will this knowledge affect how you approach or engage in debates with others? If so, how?
Discussion Questions 6/9: Free Speech & Fake News
Think about a time where you’ve changed your mind upon observing debate and disagreement. What factors were relevant to you changing your mind? E.g. were you a bystander observing the debate? Was the tone of the debate relevant?
Mill argues that we can only restrict liberties in cases where doing so prevents harm to others. He doesn’t really say what harm is though. How broadly or narrowly should we understand harm?
Give an example where the Harm Principle & Free Speech Protection seem to conflict. What should win out?
Are there any other sorts of considerations do you think might sometimes override the value of freedom of speech besides harm?
The US is relatively unique in not having a hate speech exception to free speech. Do you agree with the US on this? (Note: you might have already touched on this in thinking about #2 or 3; if so, feel free to ignore unless you have things to add!)
What role, if any, should governments have in restricting fake news? How exactly should this work?
How do we avoid concerns about authoritarianism?
Are there other concerns with governments creating free speech laws against fake news?
Are there other solutions to the problems of fake news that we haven’t discussed yet that you think are viable?
Discussion Questions 6/4: Rini on Fake News
Do you agree with Rini that it is permissible to trust co-partisan more than those who don’t share our partisan affiliations? Why or why not? If so, in what domains?
What responsibilities do individuals have to vet fake news, if any?
Rini mentions disputed norms of Social Media communication. What do you think are good norms of social media communication? For example, is a retweet an endorsement? What does liking or commenting communicate? (Not to mention the ‘wow’ react, etc.)
Assess Rini’s suggestion of having social media companies keeping track of Reputation Scores. (You might consider the concerns Rini herself raises—and think about how serious they are—as well as new ones.)
Who should be responsible for solving the problem of fake news? Government, social media, other technology companies, etc?
Discussion Questions 6/2: Frankfurt on Bullshit
On Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshit involves a lack of concern with the truth. (a) Is this necessary for something to count as bullshit? (b) Is it sufficient? Alternatively, is it (c) neither necessary nor sufficient, but merely paradigmatic?
How should Frankfurt respond to the examples like “The PE requirement is bullshit?” Could his analysis be extended/broadened to apply to these cases, or should he say that these aren’t really instances of bullshit in the sense he’s concerned with?
It is natural to think fake news outlets & propaganda intend to get people to believe falsehoods. Given Frankfurt’s account, should we instead understand them as intending to bullshit? What are the ramifications of this analysis?
These questions are about Frankfurt’s views. Consider why Frankfurt thinks this and whether you agree/disagree:
Frankfurt writes, “Bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”
Frankfurt writes, "The problem of understanding why our attitude toward bullshit is generally more benign than our attitude toward lying is an important one, which I shall leave as an exercise to the reader.”
Is this class bullshit? Are discussion sections bull sessions? Why or why not? Is this bad or good?
If time allows: How could we decrease the amount of bullshit? You might consider individual & institutional/structural solutions.
Discussion Questions 5/28: Kant on Lying
Do you agree with Kant that lying is always morally impermissible? Why or why not?
If you agree with Kant, do you think the norms of morality can conflict with the norms of friendship? If so, what should win?
Do you agree with Kant’s judgments regarding responsibility?
If you tell the murderer the truth—knowing that if you do, he’ll kill her—are you responsible for her death? (Kant says no)
If you lie to the murderer and tell the murderer that she is next-door, but then she does go next-door are you partly responsible for your friend’s death? (Kant says yes)
If you disagree with Kant’s views on lying, how would you fix Kant’s account? What are some cases where lying is morally permissible.
What do you think Kant would say about bullshit, where bullshit involves a lack of concern for the truth but not necessarily uttering falsehoods? Does bullshit violate the Categorical Imperative? Why or why not?
Discussion Questions 5/26: Famine, Affluence, & Morality
Recall the strong and moderate versions of the principle Singer offers. Singer says he “sees no good reason” to prefer the moderate version.
Do you agree with Singer’s assessment? Which version do you prefer? (Give reasons)
If we go with the strong version, how do we assess what counts as comparably significant? (This question seems especially pressing if there are any incomparable moral goods.)
Optional: How should we redraw the charity/duty distinction if we accept the moderate principle? What about the strong principle?
Several students expressed concern about the implications Singer’s view has for the value of hard work. For instance, would people who work hard not be morally permitted to reward themselves with, e.g., consumer goods? Would some countries have an incentive to not help their own citizens if they could thereby expect substantial aid from other countries? How can a utilitarian respond to these worries? (Consider, for example, the views mentioned of Sidgwick and Mill, not just Singer.)
I also encourage you to consider the extent to which luck plays a role in who is wealthy.
Singer notes that many people will find his proposal overly demanding. Suppose you were Singer’s PR person. How would you sell it to the people, and get them to adopt it? (Think about your own case: what would get you to donate/donate more, if not a theoretical argument?)
Related Question: If giving to charity is obligatory, and not supererogatory, should we still praise people for doing so? Why or why not?
Is there something special about citizens of our own country that gives us more of an obligation to prevent poverty here than abroad? Is it relevant that the poor here (on a whole) are comparatively much better off than the global poor?
Bonus/If Have Time: Singer claims that it’s irrelevant to your particular obligation what other people are doing. Do you agree? Can you think of reasons why the fact that there are other people who are equally able to give might make a difference to your particular obligation?
Discussion Questions 5/21: Partiality
How should we respond to the Puzzle of Partiality? (Reject Liberal Conception of Morality, Reject Partiality, or try to reconcile them?)
Which account of Partiality do you find most plausible? (Projects View, Relationships View, Individuals View)? Why?
Assess the objections offered by Williams and Stocker to Impartial Moral Theories? Do you find them persuasive? Why or why not?
To whom do we (sometimes) have reason to be (morally) partial? What exactly makes a relationship *special*?
Examples to think through: unhealthy friendships/family relationships; colleagues; hairdresser; members of the same sex/gender; members of the same species
In what contexts is partiality appropriate (if ever)? What about inappropriate?
Are some relationships just *intrinsically* more special (i.e. more special by their very nature)? What role do culture and expectations play?
I mentioned several different examples of partiality (Patriotism, Fandom, Friends/Family). What are the relevant moral difference between these, if any?
Discussion Questions 5/19: Keller on “Friendship and Belief”
Do you agree or disagree with the Conflict Thesis (the view that friendship norms can conflict with epistemic norms)? Why or why not? (Consider the flow chart)
Q2-5 are about Jack: Jack wants to get into a top law school. Although Jack is smart and hardworking, the acceptance rates for such programs are (let’s assume) in the single digits. As a matter of fact, most smart, hardworking people won’t get in. Jack asks you, his good friend, if you believes that he can get in. (NB: Assume that whether you believe in him will not increase his chances of getting in.)
What should you say to Jack? What should you believe?
Suppose that you don’t believe that he can get in. Should you feel bad about this? Is it appropriate for Jack to be mad or upset at you if he finds this out? (Cf. Joey/Chandler: was it appropriate for Joey to feel betrayed, and for Chandler to feel like a betrayer?)
In §9, Keller notes that we don’t have direct control over what we believe. If this is the case, can you (or Joey) really be blameworthy if you don’t believe what is allegedly required by friendship? (Can we be blameworthy for things that we can’t *directly* control?)
Now suppose that Jack fails to get into a top law school. You believed that he could get in, and told him so. But if you had been believing in accordance with the evidence, you would not have believed that. Does Jack have any reason to be upset with you that you believed that he could get in? More generally, are there cases where the norms of friendship require good epistemic behavior (e.g. serving as a reality check for your friend)?
There is empirical evidence suggesting that if a friend believes that you can do something difficult, then you are more likely to be able to do it. How do such cases affect the debate? (For example: is it more plausible in such cases that you epistemically ought to believe that your friend can do it?)
Bonus: Do some of the insights from this debate have implications for what we ought to believe about ourselves (especially when we take on difficult projects)? What about strangers?
Discussion Questions 5/14: Nozick & Feldman
Would you plug into the experience machine? Why or why not?
What do you think the Hedonist’s most promising way of responding to “The Experience Machine” and/or the “Deceived Businessman” examples?
Consider the following variant on “The Experience Machine” from Joshua Greene:
“You wake up in a plain white room. You are seated in a reclining chair with a steel contraption on your head. A woman in a white coat is standing over you. 'The year is 2659,' she explains, 'The life with which you are familiar is an experience machine program selected by you some forty years ago. We at IEM interrupt our client's programs at ten-year intervals to ensure client satisfaction. Our records indicate that at your three previous interruptions you deemed your program satisfactory and chose to continue. As before, if you choose to continue with your program you will return to your life as you know it with no recollection of this interruption. Your friends, loved ones, and projects will all be there. Of course, you may choose to terminate your program at this point if you are unsatisfied for any reason. Do you intend to continue with your program?”
Is your intuition in this case different from that in Nozick’s original example? If so, why might this be?
There are many activities that we can already perform virtually (e.g. discussion section!) although the virtual reality is typically far from perfect. Are there any activities that you enjoy or value in your life that you would be perfectly happy to perform in a perfect virtual reality world, like the Matrix? What distinguishes these activities from ones that you would rather do in the real world? (Examples you might consider: Surfing, Combat, Falling in Love, Getting Your Dream Job, etc.) [Adapted from Dave Baker]
Discussion Questions 5/12: Moore & Lewis
Assess the Rule of Attention. Do you think it gives the right (intuitively correct) verdicts? (Think about the “Princess Tutoring” example from slides.)
According to Lewis, the skeptic always succeeds at raising the standards for knowledge. Do you think this is correct? Are there cases where the skeptic *fails* to raise the standards? (Come up with 1—2 examples of your own.)
There is another alternative to skepticism and dogmatism that Lewis notes but rejects. What is it? Why does he reject it? (Optional: think about whether you agree/disagree.)
Which view do you find most plausible: Skepticism, Mooreanism, or Contextualism? Why? (If you find none of them plausible, do you have an alternative?)
Discussion Questions 5/7: Descartes
Descartes in fact consider several skeptical hypotheses: (a) dreaming argument, (b) all powerful God, (c) evil demon, (d) that he’s hallucinating everything (‘author of these thoughts’).
What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these hypotheses? (Consider, for instance, why Descartes seems to move away from (a) and (b).)
Which is most compelling to you? Are there other skeptical scenarios you think are better?
Is it plausible to you that sensory perception and imagination exist without bodies existing? Why or why not?
Several philosophers (Lichtenberg, Russell, Wittgenstein) have suggested that Descartes was not justified in asserting, “I think,” but rather that “thoughts are occurring.” In other words, Descartes cannot conclude that he existed as a thinking being, but only that thoughts exists. Comment on this objection. Can or could thoughts exist all by themselves, without a thinking person? Why or why not?
In the wax example, if the wax really changes all of its sensory objects, how do we know it’s the the one and the same object?
Descartes ultimately argues for Substance Dualism, the view that the mind and the body are distinct substances. Do you see any obvious challenges for this proposal?
Acknowledgements: Credit/Inspiration for some of these questions comes from here. Check out that page if you want even more questions about Descartes!